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One of the well-documented concerns confronting scholarly discourse about meditation
is the plethora of semantic constructs and the lack of a unified definition and taxonomy.
In recent years there have been several notable attempts to formulate new lexicons in
order to define and categorize meditation methods. While these constructs have been
useful and have encountered varying degrees of acceptance, they have also been subject
to misinterpretation and debate, leaving the field devoid of a consensual paradigm. This
paper attempts to influence this ongoing discussion by proposing two new models
which hold the potential for enhanced scientific reliability and acceptance. Regarding the
quest for a universally acceptable taxonomy, we suggest a paradigm shift away from the
norm of fabricatIng new terminology from a first-person perspective. As an alternative,
we propose a new taxonomic system based on the historically well-established and
commonly accepted third-person paradigm of Affect and Cognition, borrowed, in part, from
the psychological and cognitive sciences. With regard to the elusive definitional problem,
we propose a model of meditation which clearly distinguishes “method” from “state”
and is conceptualized as a dynamic process which is inclusive of six related but distinct
stages. The overall goal is to provide researchers with a reliable nomenclature with which
to categorize and classify diverse meditation methods, and a conceptual framework which
can provide direction for their research and a theoretical basis for their findings.
Keywords: meditation, taxonomy, definition, contemplative traditions, contemplative neuroscience, cognition,
affect, consciousness
ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITIONAL AND TAXONOMIC ISSUES
OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO DEFINITION AND
DESCRIPTION
In this section we consider various attempts to define meditation,
and discuss the conceptual issues and the difficulties encountered.
The contemplative traditions and subsequent westernization
have produced a proliferation of many disparate meditative
practices utilizing different techniques and espousing different
goals. For example, if one searchers the Yellow Pages Online
Directories for major international cities one can find numerous
listings under the heading “meditation” i.e., Los Angeles—156,
Chicago—122, N.Y.C.—307, London—126, Sydney—139, and
Stockholm—108 (as of August 1, 2013). It is quite apparent that
“meditation” has become a generic term, used to describe a host
of secular, spiritual, and/or religious contemplative activities; as
well as becoming a synonym for many other more mundane cog-
nitive functions such as contemplation, reflection, concentration,
and terms such as ponder, ruminate, cogitate, and deliberate.
Although convenient for everyday usage, the casual use of a
generic term to group any activity or practice can cause obvi-
ous difficulties in communication due to false assumptions of
similarity.
Neuroscientists and other meditation researchers have also
floundered on this point by commonly using the generic term
“meditation” to refer to a wide variety of disparate methods
which “inevitably trivializes the practices themselves” (Lutz et al.,
2007, p. 500). In addition there has been a tendency to mix-
and-match different methods as if they were equivalent which
has resulted in an unfortunate conflation of definition (Awasthi,
2013). This struggle to clearly define meditation is affirmed by
Bond et al. (2009) who identified five commonly used defini-
tional themes in their review of the meditation research literature.
Currently, the scientific literature contains two popularly used
definitions for meditation. One “camp” has defined meditation
essentially as a family of mental training techniques (e.g., Cahn
and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2008b; Raffone and Srinivasan,
2010)—which we shall call the “method definition.” The other
“camp” has defined meditation by reference to the enhanced
experiential states or altered states of consciousness which arise
from the use of these methods e.g., “pure consciousness1,”
“absolute unitary being2,” and “non-dual awareness3”—which
we shall call the “state definition.” It is obvious that difficulties
in comparing research results are inevitable when investigators
use two essentially different definitions to refer to the same
term.
This conflation of definition is exemplified by recent commen-
tary regarding attempts to classify Transcendental Meditation™
(Josipovic, 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010a,b), in which the authors
use several conceptually distinct lexicons to argue their positions.
There is a discussion as to whether “focused-attention” (FA)4,
“open-monitoring” (OM)5, or “non-dual awareness” (NDA) are
appropriate classifications for TM. However, FA and OM were
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formulated as theoretical categories of meditation techniques
based on two different cognitive strategies employed during the
method stage (Lutz et al., 2008b); whereas NDA was devised to
describe a particular enhanced state of awareness. In this case,
one author was objecting to the appropriateness of using a certain
definition of method, while the other author was using a defini-
tion based on the resultant state. Adding to the perplexity, Travis
asserted that TM should not be classified into any of the afore-
mentioned lexicons. He offered a fourth category based on an
entirely different notion—“automatic self-transcending”; a hypo-
thetical proposal of what happens when there is a shift from one
state of consciousness to another.
On the other side of the coin, several authors have stressed
the importance of making an explicit distinction betweenmethod
and state, whereas the state is considered to be the causal result of
the successful application of the method (West, 1987b; Koshikawa
and Ichii, 1996; Lutz et al., 2007; Awasthi, 2013).
Contributing to this definitional problem is the ubiquitous
paucity of information given when researchers describe methods
of meditation chosen for study (Lutz et al., 2007; Ospina et al.,
2007). Researchers typically select their meditator-subjects from
a locally available group of individuals who have been engaged in
a particular method of practice; and then identify the method by
its name and tradition as if this was sufficient. Occasionally a gen-
eral description is offered, but mostly there is a failure to account
for and report many of the salient particularities of the chosen
method—such as non-verbal vs. verbal, eyes open vs. closed, nat-
ural vs. regulated breathing, static vs. kinetic body movements,
etc. Although there have been some attempts to describe medita-
tion methods by utilizing certain salient features (Koshikawa and
Ichii, 1996; Lutz et al., 2007; Ospina et al., 2007), as of yet neuro-
scientists have not employed a standardized protocol to describe
the meditation methods they are studying. We contend that this
omission is a significant impediment to the advancement of this
field given that any, and perhaps all, of the salient features of a
given technique may affect neurobiological findings (see section
The Taxonomic Keys).
To summarize, even a casual review of the literature reveals a
frequently occurring theme lamenting the lack of a standardized
approach to define “meditation,” and the challenge this poses for
researchers (West, 1987b; Taylor, 1997; Lutz et al., 2007; Ospina
et al., 2007).
We concur that it is counter-productive if the term “med-
itation” is employed in a generic or non-descript way, and if
there is an unclear distinction between the notions of method
and state. We posit that these definitional issues may have
contributed to the confusing, contradictory, and inconsistent
findings that have emerged from the field of contemplative neu-
roscience. As we discuss later on in this paper, since method and
state demonstrate different neurobiological correlates, researchers
need to recognize what they are measuring during a given
meditation session and carefully distinguish method from state.
For example, the effects on resting state functional connectivity
(the Default Mode Network) in various meditation styles, often
reported in the literature with seemingly inconclusive/mixed find-
ings (Awasthi, 2013), may be attributed to this conflation of
definition.
OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO TAXONOMY
Awell-conceived and useful taxonomy has the power to frame all the-
oretical considerations of a particular field of study. It is natural, and
in fact historical, for scientists and philosophers to desire to segregate
and classify the things and processes of this world. (Ereshefsky, 2000,
p. 50–51).
In this section we review and analyze various attempts to devise
taxonomic categories for meditation methods, an approach quite
similar to Overview of The Problems Related to Definition and
Description above. In some ways this can be viewed as an artificial
distinction, in that the issues and particulars of taxonomy often
overlap with those of definition, especially from an historical
perspective. However, we feel that certain important distinctions
warrant separate consideration.
The struggle to formulate a universally acceptable taxonomy of
meditation has been well-documented and is exemplified by the
work of Ospina et al. (2007). Their Evidence Report: Meditation
Practices for Health: State of the Research was undoubtedly the
largest, most ambitious, and most comprehensive survey of med-
itation research ever undertaken. It included an analysis of over
1000 published papers and references. They attempted to group
over 30 meditation methods into “five broad categories” using
an empirical taxonomic approach: Mantra, Mindfulness, Tai Chi,
Qigong, and Yoga. However, this nomenclature appears to have
been contrived without an overarching theoretical framework.
The first category refers to the conceptual focus of attention, the
second refers to the cognitive strategy employed, and the oth-
ers were based on three different traditional forms of practice.
It is understandable then that their effort to construct a taxon-
omy was frustrated “given the variety of the practices and the fact
that some are single entities . . .while others are broad categories
that encompass a variety of different techniques.” They concluded
that it was “impossible to select components that might be con-
sidered universal or supplemental across practices” (p. 2–3); that
“characterization of the universal or supplemental components
of meditation practices was precluded by the theoretical and
terminological heterogeneity among practices” (p. 5); and that
since the term “meditation is an umbrella term . . . this lack of
specificity . . . precludes developing an exhaustive taxonomy of
meditation practices. (p. 10).
Currently, neuroscientists and other researchers still do not
have an overarching, consensual framework with which to under-
stand and study this highly specialized form of mental “exercise”
and its many different forms. It has occurred to us that this situ-
ation, with its robust semantic difficulties, is somewhat similar to
the conundrum that Linnaeas faced in the 1700’s.
“Three hundred years ago biological taxonomy was a chaotic
discipline marked by mis-communication and misunderstanding.
Biologists disagreed on the categories of classification, how to assign
taxa to those categories, and even how to name taxa. Fortunately for
biology, Linnaeas (attempted to) . . . bring order to taxonomy. The
system he introduced offered clear and simple rules for constructing
classifications. It also contained rules of nomenclature that greatly
enhanced the ability of biologists to communicate.” (Ereshefsky,
2000, p. 1).
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Common reasons given for the taxonomic difficulties we face
today are the complexity and diversity of meditation techniques
and the ineffable nature of the meditative state. However, we
posit that many of these difficulties can also be attributed to the
exclusive use of first-person constructs, and the limitations of the
taxonomic methods that have been employed.
The first point is illustrated by the plethora of lexicons that
have been devised to classify meditation methods over the last 40
or so years. Early proposals [as reviewed by West (1987a)] used
terms such as “concentrative vs. opening-up” (Ornstein), “con-
centrative vs. insight” (Goleman), and “wide angle lens attention
vs. zoom lens attention” (Shapiro); and recently new termi-
nology has been introduced such as “open presence6” (6); the
“active” and “passive” approaches (Newberg et al., 2001); and the
previously mentioned “focused attention,” “open monitoring,”
“non-dual awareness,” and “automatic self-transcending.” These
first-person semantic constructs have undoubtedly been helpful,
but their use as a basis for taxonomy is not without problem.
We argue that this strategy has contributed to misunderstanding,
ambiguity, and confusion, and has been an impediment toward
consensus. This is not to minimize or reject the value of first-
person accounts as important phenomenological data for medi-
tation research (Pekala, 1987). They have certainly been necessary
for such tasks as the recording of “peak experience” (Newberg
and d’Aquili, 2001) and “transcendence” (Travis and Pearson,
2000; Travis et al., 2002), or in the broader study of conscious-
ness (Wallace, 2000; Costall, 2006). However, such accounts can
be somewhat unreliable as they depend on the accurate record-
ing of the mental states of the subject and the proper accounting
of a host of varied external and internal factors. Hence, first-
person accounts lack the stability and consistency required to
provide a stand-alone, reliable foundation for scientific research.
Although first-person reports are potentially useful as data, first-
person constructs are theoretically and semantically ill-suited for
the formulation of orthogonal taxonomic domains. The difficul-
ties facing the scientific use of first person accounts has been well
known to cognitive scientists since the early 20th Century cri-
tique of “introspectionism,” but for some reasons this seems to
have escaped the scholars and neuroscientists attempting to estab-
lish scientifically usable categories for meditation taxonomies
(Dreyfus, 2013, pers. commun.).
We have concluded that an alternative approach is required.
We contend that the use of a widely accepted third-person
paradigm offers the potential for a clearer semantic distinction
and a more reliable platform/framework for research, as opposed
to the use of unique but ambiguous first-person categories, how-
ever enticing those may be.
In addition, prevailing taxonomies of meditation have
employed a “piecemeal” approach similar to classical “phenetic”
taxonomic philosophy (Ereshefsky, 2000). That is, they have
attempted to segregate meditation methods based on observable
characteristics or features e.g., grouping all methods that use a
mantra under one rubric; or trying to group methods accord-
ing to the particular cognitive strategy employed. We argue that
while such particulars may be suitable for lower order classifica-
tions of meditation, they are not sufficient for the formulation of
an over-arching system of orthogonal Domains. There are simply
too many different methods, features, nuances, and traditions
to permit higher-order categorization based solely on character-
istics (Ospina et al., 2007). While taxonomic pheneticism may
be effective for biological systems, we propose that an alterna-
tive taxonomic approach may prove to be more suitable for the
classification of meditation.
Summary
We propose to use the above analysis of the extant problems
and their root causes to devise a new definition and taxonomy
for meditation. A multi-faceted approach will include: defining
meditation as a dynamic process with separate stages that unfold
over time; a new taxonomic system which uses a well-established
third-person paradigm, in conjunction with some necessary first-
person perspectives, to formulate three Linnaean-type overarch-
ing Domains; and describing and segregating methods within
each Domain according to a table of taxonomic keys.
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY
Given the extant problems of definition and classification, how
then can we proceed to formulate a more effective descriptive
model for the discussion and study of meditation?
We proceed by defining the difference(s) between method and
state, and then propose amodel which describes how they interact
as distinct stages of a dynamic process.
DEFINITION
Rationale
As previously discussed, meditation has been typically defined
in one of two ways—as either a family of mental training tech-
niques (the “method definition”), or in relation to the particular
altered states of consciousness that arise from the implementa-
tion of the technique (the “state definition”). We address this
potentially confusing duality by proposing a model of meditation
which is inclusive of both method and state. In this paradigm,
method and state are viewed as separate stages in a dynamic pro-
cess which unfolds over time. The method is considered to be
a potentially facilitative tool and the state is the causally-related
intended result. As such, we support the premise that researchers
need to recognize and carefully segregate these two stages so as not
to confound “the neural correlates of the meditation techniques
that are used to get to particular ‘states’ of consciousness, with the
correlates of the ‘states’ themselves” (Josipovic, 2010).
A new definitional model of meditation as a dynamic process
The various stages of this dynamic process can be represented
by a standard flow diagram (see Illustration 1) which depicts
their relationship to each other as a meditation session progresses,
and helps to explain how the model works. A given meditation
session is defined as the time allocated by the meditator to the
engagement of the process; whereby the meditator starts from
a mundane state of alert/waking consciousness, moves through
the specific stages of the process over time, and then returns
to that same state of waking consciousness. This does not infer
that nothing has changed with regard to trait or plasticity, but
rather that one begins and ends in essentially the same state of
consciousness.
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This idea of considering meditation as a series of stages has
been proposed by others, most recently by Tang et al. (2012)
who advanced the idea of three stages of meditation practice. In
this model, meditation is codified into six stages. We also sug-
gest that there are important neurobiological correlates associated
with most of these stages.
Normal (N). This is the pre-meditative stage of normal wak-
ing/resting consciousness. This is the baseline state where one
is mentally preoccupied with the mundane thoughts, feelings,
and activities of daily life; and which can be distinguished from
other states of consciousness by certain defining neurobiological
correlates (Lou et al., 1999; Vaitl et al., 2005; Lutz et al., 2007).
Interestingly, this is an area that has received some attention in the
neuroscientific literature. Specifically, this subjective state appears
to be linked to what is currently regarded as the “default network”
in the brain, first described by Raichle et al. (2001). The structures
that tend to be involved in this resting or baseline state of the brain
play a role in how we ultimately utilize the brain for various cog-
nitive and affective tasks. The default mode network essentially
allows the brain to be poised to be able to react to various stimuli
or activities. There are several studies that have suggested that the
resting brain is actually altered by meditation practices. Studies
of long term meditators have revealed differences in the baseline
structure and function of the brain (Lazar et al., 2005; Pagnoni
and Cekic, 2007; Pagnoni, 2012) and, more specifically, in the
default network (Jang et al., 2011; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012).
Furthermore, longitudinal studies have shown that the resting
state of the brain can be altered by employing a regular medi-
tation practice. Thus, the normal resting state of the brain is still
a highly relevant concept in the context of meditation techniques
and their effects.
Intention to begin (IB). This is the willful intention to initiate
the process, which manifests in the actions taken to implement
the subsequent stages of the process. One can speculate that this
intention could be sustained through the preliminary stage until
the actual engagement of the Method. This is a key denotation in
our model because it highlights the importance of volition in the
engagement of the meditation process. In this paradigm medita-
tion is considered as a conscious and willful act unaided by any
extrinsic mind-altering substances, whereby the meditator exer-
cises personal control to employ a particular method. Therefore,
we also exclude the occasional transcendent experience brought
on by a serendipitous “special moment,” as well as the experi-
ence of being hypnotized by someone else through the power of
suggestion.
Initial models of meditation have indicated that this stage has
a neurophysiological correlate, most likely in the prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC) which is involved in the initiation of willful behaviors.
Early studies demonstrated increased activity in the PFC dur-
ing many different types of meditation practices. Brain imaging
studies suggest that willful acts and tasks that require sustained
attention are initiated via activity in the PFC, particularly in the
right hemisphere (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Frith et al., 1991;
Pardo et al., 1991; Ingvar, 1994). The cingulate gyrus has also
been shown to be involved in focusing attention, most likely
in conjunction with the PFC (Vogt et al., 1992). Since medita-
tion methods often require intense focus of attention, it seems
appropriate that the initiation of the meditation process begins
with activation of the PFC (particularly the right) as well as the
cingulate gyrus. This notion is supported by the increased activity
observed in these regions in several of the brain imaging studies
of volitional types of meditation (Herzog et al., 1990–1991; Lazar
et al., 2000). In a study of Tibetan Buddhist meditators, there
was increased activity in the PFC bilaterally (greater on the right)
and the cingulate gyrus during meditation (Newberg et al., 2001).
Therefore, meditation appears to start by activating those areas of
the cortex associated with the will or intent to clear the mind of
thoughts or to focus on an object.
Preliminaries (P). This is a preparatory phase in which a particu-
lar setting and certain rituals may be employed to set the “proper
tone” for the meditation session. This could consist of simply
going into a specially designated room, turning off the lights,
and sitting comfortably; and/or using a special pillow or cushion,
lighting incense and/or candles, donning a special shawl, playing
certain types of music, etc.
Rituals have certainly been found to have a substantial impact
on brain function, in part through rhythmic or repetitive ele-
ments. Thus, specific music, phrases, or objects for which the
brain is familiar, may initiate those processes that will proceed
in the method stage. For example, a number of studies have sug-
gested that music affects the brain (Satoh et al., 2003; Saito et al.,
2006; Eldar et al., 2007) particularly in the limbic or emotional
centers of the brain (Newberg et al., 2010). While there is less evi-
dence for the neurophysiological effects of specific preparatory
processes, one might speculate that activation of the amygdala
to signify that an important activity is about to occur may help
to move the brain from the default network processes to the
purposeful processes of the method stage involving the PFC
(Newberg and Iversen, 2003).
Method (M). Methods, in a general sense, can be thought of as
procedures or techniques that are employed in order to do or
accomplish something. With regard to meditation, methods have
been defined as “a family of complex emotional and attentional
regulatory training regimes developed for various ends, includ-
ing the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance” (Lutz
et al., 2008b, p. 163). Typically, one would use a training regime
in an attempt to acquire a particular skill for a particular purpose,
through practice and instruction over a period of time. When we
apply this notion to meditative practices we see that the method
is used to develop the skills to regulate (control or direct) the
mental faculties of attention and emotion. We will return to these
notions of attention (cognition) and emotion (affect) later on in
this paper.
Meditation methods typically purport to yield both immedi-
ate and long-term outcomes: the attainment of certain altered
states of consciousness during a given meditation session—often
referred to as the “state” effect (Lehmann et al., 2001; Lutz
et al., 2007); and that continued practice can lead to the real-
ization of other goals or benefits that relate to a person’s overall
approach, skill set, or perspective on life—often referred to as the
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“trait” effect (Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2007; Raffone
and Srinivasan, 2010). For the purposes of this proposal, we
have chosen to focus on that which transpires during a given
meditation session—the state effect.
In this model we consider the Method to be simply the pre-
scribed set of instructions that the meditator employs during
a meditation session. These instructions are usually imparted
by a teacher, or another form of didactic medium such as
books, videos, tapes, etc. Methods invariably contain vari-
ous cognitive strategies variously described as: concentration,
mindfulness, “focused awareness,” passive observation, “open-
monitoring,” memorization and repetition (of certain words,
phrases, or narratives), self-inquiry, contemplation, imagination
and visualization, and perception (of sounds, lights, and bod-
ily sensations). Also, the mental functions of metacognition and
control (Koriat, 2007) play an important role in the meditation
process (Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Pagnoni, 2012). The use of
metacognitive awareness and control of mind-wandering allows
the meditator to be aware of the stages of the process and stay
on task.
In addition, we think it is important to recognize that the
Method itself only holds a potential for success. One can-
not assume that the employment of a particular method is
a guarantee of efficacy because there are a host of extrin-
sic and intrinsic factors that may obviate the desired shift in
consciousness e.g., predispositions, biases, the presence of cer-
tain drugs or intoxicants, mental disorders, inability to con-
centrate, external distractions or interruptions, etc. For these
reasons we utilize the notion of the “intention” of the method
in the formulation of our taxonomic nomenclature (see sections
Determination of the Functional Essence of Meditation Methods
and Formulation of a Taxonomic Nomenclature for Meditation
Methods).
Enhanced mental state (EMS). This is the causal result of the
successful application of the Method—an altered state of con-
sciousness, commonly referred to as the meditative state. It is
usually accompanied by subjective first-person reports of a shift
in consciousness to a different and more “profound” state such
as: an enhanced sense of well-being, focus, calm, detachment,
insight, affect, bliss, emptiness, etc. EMS has been shown to have
neurobiological correlates distinct from the normal resting state
and other mundane states of human consciousness (Travis and
Pearson, 2000; Newberg and d’Aquili, 2001; Vaitl et al., 2005;
Bærentsen et al., 2009). We will consider the evidence and the-
ory supporting this distinction in the following section. EMSmay
manifest as a fleeting, momentary state (as typically reported
by novice practitioners), or may be sustained for considerable
periods of time (as typically reported by advanced/experienced
practitioners).
Our model articulates three primary types of EMS which will
be discussed in detail in section Formulation of a Taxonomic
Nomenclature for Resultant States.
Intention to finish (IF). Is the termination of the meditation ses-
sion in which the practitioner elects to end the process and return
to a mundane state of waking consciousness.
STAGES OF THE MEDITATION PROCESS 
FLOW CHART 1
N = normal(mundane) waking state IB = intention to begin
IF = intention to finish P = preliminaries
M = method EMS = enhanced mental state
*
N
IF
IB
EMS
M
P
     Note the bi-directional arrows between stages 4 and 5
to indicate that during the process the meditator may experience
shifts back-and-forth between Method and EMS.
Other possibilities
Our definitional model of meditation as a dynamic process is
intended to be inclusive of several different possibilities, and
defines meditation as an engagement of the process with the
intent of attaining an EMS. Under certain circumstances, even
though a practitioner may not engage all the stages of the pro-
cess, this would still be considered to be “meditation” according
to our model e.g., in the case of a novice practitioner who engages
the first three stages but is not successful in attaining EMS; the
practitioner who is disturbed during the Preliminary or Method
stages and quits due to extrinsic factors outside of his/her control;
or in the case of an experienced practitioner who no longer needs
the “training wheels” per se, and is capable of going directly to an
EMS at will without the aid of the Preliminary or Method stages.
TAXONOMY
The rationale for a new taxonomic model
We have attempted to avoid the problems encountered by pre-
vious efforts by employing alternatives to the prevalent first-
person/phenetic strategies.
A third-person approach. As previously noted, researchers and
scholars have typically relied on first-person perspectives and
their own linguistic ingenuity to fabricate original categories and
new terminology. We have argued that such first-person attempts
often lack scientific reliability and are thus easy targets for crit-
icism and disagreement when used in such a manner; and that
an accepted third-person construct could provide a more reli-
able semantic paradigm. Since meditation can be considered to
be a mental phenomenon, we decided to look to the fields of
Psychology and Cognitive Science for an appropriate third-person
paradigm that could serve as the cornerstone of a new taxo-
nomic nomenclature. We chose the historically well-founded and
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commonly accepted paradigm of Affect and Cognition (although
this is admittedly an arbitrary decision and other third-person
paradigms may also be suitable). We have made this choice fully
recognizing that modern theories speak to the inter-relationship
of Affect and Cognition and do not consider them to be totally
separate and distinct faculties (Forgas, 2008). Therefore, when
we refer to affective or cognitive states in this paper, we are
referring to the predominant subjective and neurobiological cor-
relates of those states, and are not assuming that such states are
in some way “totally pure”—see Formulation of a Taxonomic
Nomenclature for Resultant States. For the purposes of this paper
we reduce to commonly accepted definitions; whereas Affect
includes emotions and feelings, and Cognition includes a mul-
titude of mental processes associated with thinking, including
(but not limited to): learning, reasoning, observing, perceiving,
remembering, imagining, processing information, and acquiring
knowledge.
An essentialist approach. In addition, we attempt to avoid
the problems created by classifying meditation methods solely
according to their particular characteristics or features (the afore-
mentioned “phenetic” approach), which we have argued is prob-
lematic for such a complex phenomenon. We have adopted
an “essentialist”-type approach similar to the Aristotelian and
Linnaean schools of taxonomy (Ereshefsky, 2000), which requires
that we first determine the functional essence of whatever it is that
we want to taxonomize. We attempt to describe this functional
essence not in a philosophical way, but rather in a way that would
be useful and measurable for researchers.
Determination of the functional essence of meditation methods
Based on our review of the various contemplative traditions
and the published research in this field, we utilize the following
properties and assumptions regarding meditation methods:
• We assume that meditation methods have been derived for
specific purposes and goals.
• There is mention of ultimate, long-term benefits and goals
(the aforementioned “trait” effect) such as: the attainment of
enhanced attentional and emotional acumen, purification of
the mind and/or the heart, stress-reduction, a greater sense
of well-being, attainment of wisdom, equanimity, compassion,
liberation, enlightenment, etc.
• In order to accomplish these ultimate goals, meditation meth-
ods utilize techniques that have been designed to accomplish
a more immediate goal—to facilitate a shift from the nor-
mal state of consciousness to an altered state of consciousness
within a given meditation session—the aforementioned “state”
effect. We have used the term EMS to describe this altered state.
• Methods will vary depending on their ultimate goal(s) and
their particular techniques that have been designed to engender
a targeted EMS relevant to that goal.
• The successful attainment of the targeted EMS ultimately
depends on a host of extrinsic and intrinsic factors.With regard
to the practitioner, one must account for such factors as experi-
ence and expertise, motivation, current state of mind and body,
the presence of intoxicants or other drugs, etc. These intrinsic
factors will undoubtedly affect the quality and experience of
the EMS regardless of what the method purports or intends to
accomplish.
• Therefore, we must consider the method to be just a facilitative
tool, which only offers the potential, not a guarantee, for the
attainment of immediate and ultimate goals.
• The ultimate goals are more challenging (if not impossible) to
measure and evaluate given current scientific knowledge and
instrumentation.
For these reasons, we have defined the functional essence of the
method in terms of its intended immediate goal—the targeted
EMS. That is, what it was designed to do during a given medita-
tion session that could be measured in a laboratory setting. This
idea that a given method can possess a specific intended or tar-
geted outcome is supported in the literature by those who discuss
the need to account for the aims, purposes, goals, and effects of
particular meditation techniques (West, 1987b; Koshikawa and
Ichii, 1996; Lehmann et al., 2001; Carter et al., 2005; Hankey,
2006; Lutz et al., 2007; Ospina et al., 2007). Since it is some-
what awkward to think of methods as having intention, for the
purposes of this paradigm we use the idea of “directionality”
to convey this notion of a targeted outcome. In this sense the
EMS can be thought of as the immediate destination, and the
Method as the set of instructions, or the map, of how to get
there.
Formulation of a taxonomic nomenclature for meditation methods
We proceed by combining taxonomic essentialism with a third-
person approach. By framing this notion of directionality within
the aforementioned paradigm of Affect and Cognition, we have
formulated a new taxonomic nomenclature consisting of three
overarching Domains:
• The Affective Domain represents those methods which pur-
port to engender an enhanced affective state (EAS) during
the meditation session. These are typified by traditional meth-
ods such as the compassion and loving-kindness techniques of
Tibetan and Theravada Buddhism. These methods would be
classified as affective-directed methods (ADM).
• The Null Domain represents those methods which purport to
create an enhanced empty state that is devoid of phenomeno-
logical content—a non-cognitive/non-affective state (NC/NA
EMS). Suchmethods would be classified as null-directedmeth-
ods (NDM), typified by such techniques as TM, Zen satori
methods, and Yoga methods aimed at the dissolution of the
sense of self.
• All remaining techniques (by default) fall to the Cognitive
Domain and thus would be classified as cognitive-directed
methods (CDM). These are typified by traditional methods
such as samatha and vipassana and would include all those
methods that purport to engender an enhanced cognitive state
(ECS) i.e., one-pointedness, mindfulness, or insight.
The assignment of Domains to actual meditation methods is
demonstrated by example in section Use of the Taxonomic Keys
and Domains, Nine Examples.
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Formulation of a taxonomic nomenclature for resultant states
Once we have devised a classification of methods based on direc-
tionality, we then formulate an appropriate nomenclature for the
resultant states. In this taxonomic model, each type of method is
causally related to one of the following three resultant statesa (see
Ill. #2 below). This hypothesis is based in part on the idea that
enhanced states of cognition, affect, and emptiness demonstrate
distinctly different and measurable subjective and neurobiolog-
ical correlates (Travis and Pearson, 2000; Lehmann et al., 2001;
Dagleish, 2004; Carter et al., 2005; Hankey, 2006; Lutz et al., 2007,
2008a; Davidson, 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010a; Josipovic et al.,
2012; Leung et al., 2013).
Enhanced cognitive state (ECS). Is defined as the resultant state
of consciousness due to the successful employment of a CDM,
in which the phenomenological content is primarily cognitive
in nature. For example, we would classify the resultant state to
be an ECS if a particular technique resulted in complete “one-
pointedness”—“the maintained focus of attention on a single
object” (Carter et al., 2005, p. 412). There is a significant body
of research in support of this notion of an enhanced cognitive
meditative state.
Supportive neuroscientific findings. From a brain perspective,
we would likely consider such a state as involving activity in one
or more of the cortical areas of the brain that subserve higher
cognitive processing such as areas of the brain that support ver-
bal reasoning or abstract processes. A number of studies have
reported increased functioning in the frontal lobes particularly
the PFC in subjects performing a concentration-based cogni-
tive directed meditation practice (Herzog et al., 1990–1991; Lou
et al., 1999; Lazar et al., 2000). For example, Tibetan Buddhist
meditation that incorporated concentration on a visual object
demonstrated a number of complex changes including relatively
increased cerebral blood flow (CBF) in the PFC and cingu-
late gyrus (Newberg et al., 2001). Another study found that
Vipassana meditation activated the rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC) and the dorsal medial PFC in both hemispheres
(Holzel et al., 2007). In addition these investigators found that
Vipassana meditation might enhance cerebral activity in brain
areas related to interoception and attention, such as the PFC, the
right anterior insula and the right hippocampus (Holzel et al.,
2008). Thus, these findings support the taxonomic approach
that cognitive-directed meditation practices activate cortical areas
involved in cognitive functions such as attention and abstract
thought. Additional support for this notion can be found in
studies evaluating differences in “trait” characteristics and task
performance between experienced and less-experienced medita-
tors; and several of these reports have shown that such cognitive-
directed practices result in overall improved cognitive processing
aIt is important to note that we are not assuming that these three states are
in some way totally “pure” and unrelated to each other, but rather that they
are essentially different. For example, we are not saying that an ECS needs to
be totally and completely devoid of any affective phenomenological content,
and vice versa. Rather, we are proposing that each of these categories repre-
sents a specific and distinctive type of experience that allows each one to be
differentiated from the others.
which can be related to site-specific cortical function (Valentine
and Sweet, 1999; Carter et al., 2005; Chan and Woollacott,
2007; Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007; Moore and Malinowski, 2009;
Hodgins and Adair, 2010; van den Hurk et al., 2010; Pagnoni,
2012).
Enhanced affective state (EAS). Is defined as the resultant state
of consciousness due to the successful employment of an ADM,
in which the phenomenological content is primarily an emo-
tion or feeling such as loving-kindness or compassion (so called
matters of the “heart”). Lutz describes this as “the generation
of a state in which an unconditional feeling of loving-kindness
and compassion pervades the whole mind as a way of being,
with no other consideration, or discursive thoughts” (2008a, p.
1) Although these are not considered as emotions by traditional
Buddhist philosophy, they can be considered as affect when inter-
preted intoWestern/English “mental typologies” (Dreyfus, 2002),
and many modern researchers have done so. There is a significant
body of research in support of this notion of an enhanced affective
meditative state.
Supportive neuroscientific findings. Affect can be distinguished
by distinct and measurable subjective and neurobiological
correlates (Dagleish, 2004; Hanson and Mendius, 2009). Many
modern researchers consider compassion/loving-kindness not
only to be an expression of affect but have reported distinct
neurophysiological correlates associated with this state (Lutz
et al., 2008a; Davidson, 2010; Menezes et al., 2012; Leung et al.,
2013; Mascaro et al., 2013). For example, Lutz et al. (2008a)
reported distinctive activation of the limbic regions including
the insula and cingulate cortices; right temporoparietal junc-
tion; and posterior superior temporal sulcus during Tibetan
Buddhist compassion meditation. Davidson (2010) hypothesized
that loving-kindness meditation activates circuits associated with
positive affect including the ventral striatum, orbital frontal cor-
tex, and dorsolateral regions of the PFC. Lutz et al. state that cer-
tain meditation methods can “regulate emotions associated with
altered activation of the limbic system” (2008a, p. 2). Mascaro
et al. (2013) reported increased neural activity in the IFG and
the dmPFC during compassion meditation. Leung et al. (2013)
reported increased gray matter volume in the right angular gyrus
and right posterior parahippocampal gyrus in subjects perform-
ing loving-kindness meditation. Furthermore, there appears to
be a distinct pattern of brain activity associated with medita-
tion practices associated with an EAS vs. those associated with
an ECS. For example, Carter et al. (2005) reported distinct differ-
ences of functional effects on the visual switching rivalry between
one-pointedness meditation and compassion meditation, and
Travis and Shear (2010a) reported different EEG patterns for
compassion meditation vs. focused attention vs. TM.
Enhanced non-cognitive/Non-affective state (NC/NA). Is defined
as the resultant state of consciousness due to the successful
employment of a NDM. This enhanced state is much more chal-
lenging to define as it infers the absence of affect and cognition—
an empty state with no phenomenological content. This notion of
emptiness has manifested in a host of semantic constructs derived
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from diverse spiritual/religious traditions and languages i.e.,
nirodha-sama¯patti (Pali), samadhi (Sanskrit), satori (Japanese),
dzogchen (Tibetan). However, attempts to translate these terms
into English have struggled to capture the essence of this ineffable
and non-conceptual state of consciousness. As such, many dif-
ferent terms have evolved depending on cultural/religious belief
systems, linguistic perspectives, and perceptions of the underlying
ontology of meditation practice. The examples are numerous and
include such ideas as: God Consciousness, Christ Consciousness,
Buddha Consciousness, cosmic consciousness, pure conscious-
ness, true-Self, non-Self, NDA, absolute unitary being; and other
terms such as Formless, Void, emptiness, and undifferentiated
“beingness” or “suchness.” We can also look to well-known
Yogic teachers or Masters for their commentary. According to Sri
Nisgaradatta Maharaj, there is a merging into a state of nothing-
ness accompanied by a loss of sense of Self and duality (Powell,
1994); Osho describes samadhi as “no object in the mind, no
content . . . . . ., not meditating upon something, but dropping
everything (so that) not even a ripple arises in the lake of your
consciousness.” (Osho, 2003); and Sri Ramana Maharshi states
that “samadhi is the state in which the unbroken experience of
existence is attained by the still mind” (Godman, 1985). For the
purposes of this essay, we consider all these terms and descriptions
to refer to the same state. There is a significant body of research
in support of this notion of an enhanced non-cognitive/non-
affective meditative state.
Supportive neuroscientific findings. From a neurophysiological
perspective, we might posit that this NC/NA state is associated
with decreased activity levels in the areas that subserve both
cognition and affect. Newberg et al. have long postulated a rela-
tionship with the parietal lobe (Newberg and Iversen, 2003).
The PSPL is heavily involved in the analysis and integration
of higher-order visual, auditory, and soma-esthetic information
(Adair et al., 1995). It is also involved in a complex attentional
network that includes the PFC and thalamus (Fernandez-Duque
and Posner, 2001). Through the reception of auditory and visual
input from the thalamus, the PSPL is able to help generate a
three-dimensional image of the body in space, provide a sense
of spatial coordinates in which the body is oriented, help distin-
guish between objects, and exert influences in regard to objects
that may be directly grasped and manipulated (Lynch et al., 1980;
Mountcastle et al., 1981). These functions of the PSPL might be
critical for distinguishing between the self and the external world.
It should be noted that a recent study has suggested that the supe-
rior temporal lobe may play a more important role in body spatial
representation. This has not been confirmed by other reports
(Karnath et al., 2001), so the actual relationship between the pari-
etal and temporal lobes in terms of spatial representation remains
speculative.
Regardless, deafferentation of these orienting areas of the brain
has been suggested as an important mediator in the physiology
of meditation (Newberg and Iversen, 2003). We have postulated
that the mechanism by which deafferentation might occur is
through the action of GABA, released by the reticular nucleus.
Thus, GABA, acting as the primary inhibitory neurotransmitter
[originally hypothesized by Austin, 1999], might inhibit incoming
neuronal information into the PSPL. One can speculate that there
is something about certain meditation techniques (NDM) that
can trigger this deafferentation effect. If this occurs to a sub-
stantial degree it could result in the dampening of cognitive and
affective processes creating a state devoid of phenomenological
content in which the person may begin to temporarily lose their
usual ability to spatially define their notion of self or differenti-
ate the self from the rest of the world—an experience which one
could interpret as non-self, or emptiness. Such a notion is sup-
ported by clinical findings in patients with parietal lobe damage
who have difficulty orienting themselves. The effects of medita-
tion are likely to be more selective and do not destroy the sense of
self, but alter the perception of it. This concept of deafferenta-
tion of the PSPL has been supported by two imaging studies
demonstrating decreased activity in this region during intense
meditation (Herzog et al., 1990–1991; Newberg et al., 2001).
Other investigators have found support for specific brain func-
tions associated with the non-cognitive, non-affective state. For
example, Lehmann et al. (2001) investigated multi-states engen-
dered by a single advanced meditator and found that meditation
on the dissolution of the self resulted in increased right brain
activity more anterior and superior than other forms of med-
itation that were visual or mantra dependent: right superior
frontal gyrus; right PFC. Hankey (2006) reported psychophysi-
ological correlates for “pure consciousness” associated with TM
that were distinctly different than one-pointed and compassion
techniques. These changes appear to extend beyond brain pro-
cesses as Travis and Pearson (2000) reported distinct changes in
sympathetic and parasympathetic measures during these states of
“pure consciousness.”
STAGES OF THE MEDITATION PROCESS 
FLOW CHART 2 
N = normal waking state IB = intention to begin  IF = intention to finish
P = preliminaries  M = method: (CDM)(ADM)(NDM)
EMS = enhanced mental state: (ECS) (EAS) (NC/NA)
ECS    EAS   NC/NA
NDM
ADM
CDM  
N
IF
IB
EMS
M
P
The taxonomic keys
Sub-classification of methods within the three Domains is accom-
plished by applying a system of taxonomic keys, a concept
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borrowed from the Science of Systematics (Mayr, 1969). We pro-
pose that this idea can also be used to address the need for
a standardized description of meditation methods (a Standard
Profile of Meditation Methods). We argue that this approach
enablesmethods to bemore thoroughly and accurately compared.
In addition, it allows researchers to account for the neurophysio-
logical effects associated with many of these elements as described
in some detail below (for a condensed version of these keys see
Table A1 of Taxonomic Keys—Appendix).
Initial descriptor. The initial descriptor should include the name
of the technique with reference to any particular style or subset
(because several techniques may be grouped together under one
generic name, when in fact they may be significantly different).
A general reference to the history, origin and culture would be
optional.
The specific keys. The keys are based on the explicit direc-
tions contained within the method, the overall approach that is
employed, and third person elements that can be observed in the
laboratory.
(1) Description of the specific cognitive strategy(ies) which are
prescribed for the practitioner within the method’s direc-
tions (what one has to do in order to achieve the intended
result) i.e., concentration; focused attention or awareness;
passive observation without attachment; visualization and
imagination; memorization and repetition; selective aware-
ness; effortless awareness; contemplation, introspection, and
inquiry; sensual perception(s), etc. Neuroscientifically, this is
an important element since there could be distinct changes
observed in the brain and body depending on the strategy
used. For example, a visualization task is likely to activate the
visual cortex, whereas reciting a prayer or phrase is likely to
activate the verbal centers of the brain (Newberg et al., 2003,
2010; Peres et al., 2012).
(2) Description of the conceptual and/or physical foci—the
object(s) of attention i.e., mantra, symbol, image, phrase,
idea, narrative, sound, light, etc. Similar to above, the focus
on distinct images might produce different physiological
effects depending on whether the images are simple, com-
plex, color, or black and white. Listening to music or a
voice guiding the meditation might result in activation of the
auditory pathways in the brain.
(3) Description of any beliefs or special knowledge either sug-
gested or required; i.e., in relation to a particular theoretical,
religious, spiritual, metaphysical, or philosophical system.
While this is more difficult to identify from a neurophysio-
logical perspective, several studies have explored the neural
bases of different beliefs, especially between those who are
believers and non-believers (Harris et al., 2009).
(4) Notation of whether the eyes are closed or are open and used
in some specific fashion. Brain function is clearly affected
by visual processes and there is substantial activation in
the visual cortex when the eyes are open, especially when
observing a complex scene.
(5) Notation of whether the process is static or kinetic. “Static”
refers to a stationary body but not necessarily an immobile
body. Therefore, bodily movements may occur but the body
still remains essentially in one place as when the medita-
tor changes postures during a single meditation session (i.e.,
from an upright sitting position to a more reclined posi-
tion), or experiences involuntary jerking motions (kriyas).
“Kinetic” refers to prescribed movements of the body with
specific postural instructions; usually, but not limited to,
movement of the extremities such as in walking mindful-
ness training, Tai Chi, mudras (hand movements), or even
“bouncing” as in TM-Siddhi “yogic flying.” This element
relates to motor activity in the brain including the motor
cortex, basal ganglia, and cerebellum which are all involved
in body movement. In addition, movement can be associ-
ated with differences in energy utilization, adrenal function,
cardiovascular function, and respiratory function.
(6) Notation of whether the process is silent or auditory or both.
Vocalization will certainly demonstrate specific cortical activ-
ity and the auditory cortex and thalamusmay be differentially
activated in the presence of sound. Regarding silent vs. the
vocal use of mantra and chanting, scientists may need to
account for the sub-vocalization effect associated with inner
speech, even when it is quiet.
(7) Notation of whether a specific type of postural position is
suggested or required i.e., normal seated, straight spine, lotus
position, fully reclined, etc. This key could be considered as a
sub-set of the “static” denotation in #5 above. The brain may
respond differently to being in, and maintaining, different
postures. Proprioceptive functions are likely to be particu-
larly related to this element as the brain works to ensure that
a posture is maintained.
(8) Notation of whether the process is intrinsic (self-
reliant/independent) or extrinsic (dependent on an outside
person or process). There is some evidence to suggest that
performing meditation under one’s own volition vs. being
guided can result in substantial differences in brain function.
Frontal lobe activity in particular might be affected as
evidence suggests decreased frontal activity during externally
guided word generation compared to internal or volitional
word generation (Crosson et al., 2001). Thus, prefrontal and
cingulate activation may be associated with the intrinsic vs.
extrinsic aspects of meditation.
(9) Notation of whether there are any specific recommendations
for type or control of breathing. Breathing, especially when
controlled, can result in specific changes in brain and body
physiology. Controlled breathing may alter heart rate, blood
pressure, andmetabolism while also changing the function of
the brain (Floyd et al., 2003; Barnes et al., 2008).
Considered in their totality, these taxonomic keys should help to
present a relatively full description of the overall meditation tech-
nique. Furthermore, since many of these keys can be observed
from a third person perspective (i.e., eyes open or closed; body
static or kinetic), they provide a more objective way of assessing
the method and the extent to which the subject has performed the
method.
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It should be noted that it has been suggested that some med-
itation methods could be considered to be essentially “somatic”
in nature and therefore warrant classification into a separate
Somatic Domain (i.e., Tai Chi, standing Qigong, and some forms
of Yoga). However, given that meditation methods are considered
to be mental training regimes and not physical training, we con-
cluded that it would be inappropriate to devise an over-arching
domain based on somatic considerations. Rather, we account
for somatic characteristics as a sub-classification under the fifth
(kinetic/static) and seventh (postural) taxonomic keys.
Use of the taxonomic keys and Domains, nine examples
This section demonstrates howmeditation methods can be classi-
fied, described, and sub-classified (see Tables 1, 2) using the three
Domains and the taxonomic keys. For this demonstration we have
selected nine examples (in no particular order) based on the fol-
lowing criteria: fairly well-known Eastern meditation methods
which possess historical tradition; meditationmethods favored by
researchers in recent studies; meditation methods which give the
practitioner (and researcher) a reasonable idea of what to expect
from a successful meditation session.
The following assignment of taxonomic keys and Domains is
only intended to demonstrate how the application of this model
can be used to more thoroughly describe various meditation
methods, and should not be taken to be a final delineation, only
a tentative one. Our determinations were based on a review of
the relevant literature, personal communication with experienced
practitioners, and the personal experience of the authors with sev-
eral of the following methods. We recognize that this is far from
sufficient for the formulation of definitive method profiles and
classifications. It would be far better to recruit the input of expert
practitioners and attempt to arrive at a consensus regarding the
Table 1 | Examples of the sub-classification of the three domains.
CDM ADM NDM
Samatha NRLK (dmig med snying rje) TM
Vipassana
Kirtan Kriya Samatha metta and karuna So’ham Japa
Tai Chi Chuan
Table 2 | Sub-classification of four different cognitive-directed
methods.
keys and the assignment of Domain. In addition, “final” deter-
minations of Domain would also require confirmation through
scientific research (see Suggestions for Future Studies below). For
example, in order to make a more definitive assignment of a par-
ticular method into the Affective Domain there would first need
to be some sort of consensus among experts that the method
in question does in fact purport to engender an EAS. Secondly,
this claim would need to be supported by research findings of
affective phenomenological content and affective neurobiological
correlates.
1. Transcendental meditation (TM). Coined and introduced to
the West by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in the late 1950s—early 60s;
proponents claim that TM is derived from ancient Indian tra-
dition while others consider it to be based on “a neo-Vedanta
metaphysical philosophy” (Olson, 2007).
(1) Utilizes awareness, and repetition which proponents claim
to be “effortless,” and which induces “automatic self-
transcending” to a state of “pure consciousness” (Travis and
Shear, 2010a,b; Travis, 2013, pers. commun.).
(2) Attention is on a mantra, although proponents state that this
is not a form of focused attention, but rather an awareness of
mantra (Travis, 2013, pers. commun.).
(3) There are no religious/belief requirements.
(4) The eyes are closed.
(5) The basic form is static; and there is a more advanced kinetic
form known as Siddhi “Yogic –flying.”
(6) Non-verbal, whereas the mantra is repeated silently, not out-
loud.
(7) Seated comfortably, no strict postural requirements.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) Normal breathing, no special breathing instructions or
requirements.
We have classified TM into the NDM Domain because the tech-
nique as we understand it aims to engender a non-cognitive/non-
affective EMS.
2. Tai Chi Chuan.b A technique of Chinese Taoist origin has
evolved into many different styles; originally developed as a form
of martial art (literally translated as grand ultimate fist, and it was
known as a boxing style); today is rarely used as a self-defense
technique but rather is considered bymany to be a form of “move-
ment meditation” (Ospina et al., 2007) for the promotion of good
health.
(1) Utilizes focused concentration, memorization, and
visualization.
(2) The physical focus is on the body, the conceptual focus is on
the “chi.”
bWe chose to include Tai Chi on this list because it is a good example of
a kinetic form, even though the field currently does not have unobtrusive
instrumentation with which to evaluate such a method and it is still debatable
whether it is truly a form of meditation or not.
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(3) Understanding of, and belief in the Taoist chi energy system
is suggested but not required, knowledge of the founder and
the lineage of the particular style is also encouraged.
(4) Eyes are opened and the gaze is used to “lead” the bodily
movements.
(5) Kinetic.
(6) Usually non-verbal.
(7) Specific postural forms are required.
(8) Usually learned in an extrinsic manner (guidance by
an instructor) but progresses to an intrinsic, self-guided
practice.
(9) Control of breathing may or may not be required.
We have classified Tai Chi into the CDM Domain because the
technique as we understand it aims to produce a highly concen-
trative EMS.
3. Vipassana Meditation. A traditional Buddhist technique;
Pali/Sanskrit language commonly translated as insight or mind-
fulness. Caution must be exercised when attempting to classify
this method because there are several different forms and styles
in current practice all under the same name of Vipassana. For
the purposes of this paper we will consider the Goenka method
(Goenka, 1987) since many research studies use subjects who
employ this technique.
(1) Utilizes mindfulness, detached observation, contemplation,
and insight.
(2) The physical foci of attention is on the body using a “body-
scan” technique with a prescribed narrative.
(3) Knowledge and belief in the teachings of Buddhism is
essential in order to relate the experiences of the med-
itation to an insight/wisdom into your own nature and
to develop an experiential understanding of the “Three
Universal Characteristics” (see The Discourse Summaries,
Goenka, 1987).
(4) Eyes are closed.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Upright seated position on the floor, lotus posture if possible.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) Normal breathing, no special breathing instructions or
requirements.
We have classified Goenka Vipassana into the CDM Domain
because the technique as we understand it aims to lead the
meditator to an understanding/insight of essential Buddhist
principles via a cognitive EMS.
4. Tibetan Non-Referential Unconditional Loving-Kindness
technique (NRLK)(dmigs med snying rje).Of traditional Tibetan
Buddhist origin.
(1) Utilizes concentration, contemplation, and visualization.
(2) The conceptual foci of attention is on a prescribed narrative
and the emotions that are generated.
(3) Understanding and belief in the teachings of Buddhism is
suggested but not required, belief in the value of extending
loving-kindness to all sentient beings is required.
(4) Eyes-open.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Upright seated position, lotus posture if possible.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) Normal breathing, no special breathing instructions, or
requirements.
We have classified NRLK into the ADM Domain because the
technique as we understand it aims to create an affective EMS.
5. Samatha Meditation. An ancient contemplative practice
believed to have originated in India, traditionally associated with
Buddhism, of Pali/Sanskrit language translated as “calm” or “qui-
escence” but usually considered to mean concentration. There are
several forms of samatha meditation and many different objects
of focus (forty are listed in traditional Buddhist texts), but all are
intended to calm and focus the mind. Here we will consider only
two of them.
• Concentration on the breath.
(1) Utilizes concentration and visualization as themain cognitive
strategies.
(2) The physical focus of attention is on the breath and the parts
of the body associated with breathing, especially the nose.
(3) Knowledge and belief in the teachings of Buddhism is recom-
mended but not essential.
(4) Eyes closed.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Seated with straight spine.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) There are specific breathing instructions.
We have classified samatha concentration on the breath into the
CDMDomain because the technique as we understand it aims for
the practitioner to attain a one-pointed, cognitive EMS.
• Metta (loving-kindness) and karuna (compassion).
(1) Utilizes concentration and visualization as themain cognitive
strategies.
(2) The conceptual foci of attention is on a prescribed set of
instructions and the emotions that are generated.
(3) Knowledge and belief in the teachings of Buddhism is sug-
gested but not required, belief in the value of extending
compassion and loving-kindness to all sentient beings is
required.
(4) Eyes closed.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Seated with straight spine.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) No special breathing instructions or requirements.
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We have classified samatha metta and karuna meditation into the
ADM Domain because the technique as we understand it aims to
create an affective EMS.
6. Zen Meditation (zazen). Translated from the Japanese as
“seated meditation,” of traditional Buddhist Mahayana tradition
introduced to Japan in the 11–12th Century. Today there are var-
ious schools in the East and West, such as Rinzai and Soto, and
there are various techniques, some of which are reserved for more
advanced and experienced practitioners. For the purposes of this
essay we have chosen an elementary form of the kufu-zazen koan
technique used in the Rinzai approach.
(1) Utilizes concentration, memorization and repetition, analysis
and insight as the primary cognitive strategies.
(2) The conceptual focus is on various koans (paradoxical
riddles).
(3) Usually no particular knowledge or belief is required for
beginners, knowledge and belief in Buddhist teachings is
essential for advancement.
(4) Eyes-open.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Specific instructions for seated posture, traditionally with
cushion on the floor.
(8) Intrinsic and/or extrinsic if there is a Master-student
interaction(sanshi-manbo).
(9) Specific breathing instructions may be applied.
We have classified this particular Zen technique into the CDM
Domain because, according to our understanding, it aims to
lead the practitioner to insight through inquiry. Other Zen tech-
niques directed toward the attainment of one-pointedness would
also be classified as CDM; and if an experienced practitioner
uses a Zen technique to attain satori it would be considered
a NDM.
7. So’ham Japa (also known as Hamsa). Considered to be a Yoga
technique of Indian origin, and introduced to the West by Swami
Muktananda in the late 1960’s—early 1970’s.
(1) A concentrative strategy.
(2) The focus is on mantra and breathing.
(3) Belief in the basic teachings and tenants of Hindu philos-
ophy such as Vedanta, and Kashmir Shaivism is suggested
but not required; in addition, there is often a strong belief
in the power of the Guru-disciple relationship and that the
mantra and the technique must be empowered by a Spiritual
Master in order to be efficacious and to facilitate a spiritual
“awakening” (Muktananda, 1969; Shankarananda, 2003).
(4) Eyes are closed.
(5) Static.
(6) Non-verbal.
(7) Comfortable seated posture is suggested.
(8) Intrinsic.
(9) Specific instructions for awareness and method of breathing.
We have classified So’ham Japa into the NDM Domain because
the technique, as we understand it, aims at producing a non-
cognitive/non-affective EMS, a state of samadhi in which the
meditator experiences his “true nature” (Muktananda, 1969).
8. Kirtan Kriya. Is a Yogic practice introduced to the West by
Yogi Bhajan in the late 1960’s—early 70’s. Proponents claim
it to be a traditional form of Kundalini Yoga of Northern
Indian origin, and taught by a lineage of Sikh Masters for
over 500 years (see Kundalini Yoga websites www.3ho.org and
www.kundaliniresearchinstitute.org). There are many forms of
Kirtan Kriya meditation. The following application of the taxo-
nomic keys is based on the “12minute” form studied in recent
neuroscientific investigations (Khalsa et al., 2009; Wang et al.,
2011; Black et al., 2013).
(1) Utilizes concentration, memorization, repetition, and visual-
ization.
(2) Conceptual focus is primarily on mantra and breath.
(3) Knowledge and belief in the basic tenants of Hindu philos-
ophy, and the notions of kundalini energy and chakras, is
suggested but not required.
(4) Eyes closed.
(5) Static in overall body position but also kinetic during those
times when the practitioner employs prescribed hand move-
ments known as mudrasc.
(6) Uses both verbal chanting and non-verbal recitation of a
series of four mantrasc.
(7) Seated on a chair or on the floor with straight spine.
(8) Intrinsic, although extrinsic guided-mediations are also used
at timesc.
(9) Normal comfortable breathing, although some practitioners
use various forms of pranayam breathing techniquesc.
We have classified this style of Kirtan Kriya into theCDMDomain
because the technique, as we understand it, aims at calming and
focusing the mind by producing a cognitive EMS.
SUMMARY
This paper has attempted to be helpful to researchers and writers
in the field of contemplative neuroscience in several ways. In order
to improve communication among scholars, we proposed a con-
ceptual model of meditation as a dynamic process that could help
to avoid the conflation of definition that has plagued this field
for many years. Considering meditation as a series of connected
yet distinct stages also presents new opportunities for targeted
research and evaluation.
Our effort was also motivated by the belief that in order for
this (or any) relatively new field to progress it is essential for
researchers to have a valid, reliable, and universally acceptable
means with which to taxonomize and compare their findings.
cThe Kirtan Kriya method poses descriptive, taxonomic, and research chal-
lenges because there are options for applying several opposing keys during a
single meditation session. As such, in this case, and in other similar cases, it
is important to note which options are, and are not, being employed by the
practitioner at any given point in time.
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To this end we have attempted to influence due consideration
toward the utilization of a third-person codification for medi-
tation methods, for which we chose the domains of Affect and
Cognition. In addition, we have attempted to demonstrate the
advantages of utilizing an essentialist-type taxonomic system to
identify the functional essence of methods in terms of their
immediate intended goal, which we labeled “directionality.” This
approach enabled us to formulate three overarching, potentially
orthogonal categories, and segregate meditation methods into
three Linnaean-type Domains: CDM, ADM, and NDM. We also
used this nomenclature to describe the causally related enhanced
states associated with each of these Domains.
Finally, we attempted to address the current lack of a standard-
ized descriptive protocol for the study of meditation methods,
which we feel is an important oversight and impediment. We
proposed the use of a taxonomic key system as a means of delin-
eating the salient features into a Standard Profile of Meditation
Methods. We also provided examples of how such a protocol
could be used to describe several well-known and often studied
methods, and how it could be used to sub-classify methods within
a given Domain.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
• The use of a system of validated taxonomic keys to create
definitive descriptive profiles, sorted by Domain, that could
serve as a comprehensive compendium of meditation meth-
ods. This can be accomplished by soliciting the input of expert
practitioners and proponents of each method (similar to the
approach used by Koshikawa and Ichii (1996) and by using a
questionnaire and standardized interview methodology simi-
lar to the modified Delphi consensus technique employed by
Ospina et al. (2007) and Bond et al. (2009).
• Research studies utilizing a variety of established neuroscien-
tific methods to test the usefulness and orthogonal relationship
of the various stages of the proposed process model.
• Research studies utilizing a variety of established neuroscien-
tific methods to test the validity of our three Domains based on
affective, cognitive, and null enhanced states. The hope would
be to develop a neurophysiological “signature” or profile for
each Domain. There is support for this notion that a given EMS
can be identified in the laboratory setting using standardized
methods (Travis and Pearson, 2000; Travis et al., 2002; Travis
and Arenander, 2006; Newberg and d’Aquili, 2001; Lutz et al.,
2007). We posit that the three types of EMS proposed in this
paper can be similarly defined using the methodologies that
have been previously developed and tested.
• Developing the methodology and instrumentation for moni-
toring and measuring kinetic forms of meditation, as well as
devising additional taxonomic keys for these types of methods.
CONCLUSION
Our proposal for a new taxonomy of meditation is intended to
offer a fresh approach to this difficult but necessary task, and
hopefully will help to further the process for developing a much
needed standard. It is not to be construed that we are here claim-
ing to have arrived at a complete and final explication. Rather
we have offered an alternative paradigm with the intention of
stimulating interest in the advantages of using an essentialist
third-person approach. Should this model prove useful to the cur-
rent field of contemplative neuroscience, we fully expect it to be
tested and challenged by future findings and new theories. Even
the “Mother” of all taxonomies, the great work of Linnaeas (which
has been a standard for almost 300 years), has become somewhat
obsolete given recent findings from cellular and genetic biology
(Ereshefsky, 2000).
Our three overarching Domains are intended to provide
researchers with a reliable conceptual framework for their find-
ings by pointing to cognitive and affective states and their neuro-
biological correlates. We contend that it is essential for researchers
(and all interested parties) to know more than just the name and
a general description of the particular meditation method that
is being studied. The use of the taxonomic keys in conjunction
with the three Domains presents a replicable descriptive standard
for the study of meditation methods. This protocol offers a way
for researchers to more effectively account for the neurobiological
correlates associated with those salient features of themethod that
could confound their findings. Undoubtedly, research findings are
affected by factors such as whether the subject is meditating with
their eyes open or shut, using specific body movements, or ver-
balizing in some manner. Such information, when presented in
a standardized fashion, could facilitate a more cogent analysis of
the differences and similarities reported for various meditation
methods, and help with the task of trying to isolate the state from
the method.
We recognize that this proposal, as with any taxonomy,
must ultimately be evaluated by its usefulness to scholars and
researchers. As such, we have purposely steered clear of metaphys-
ically charged claims of attainment and non-conceptual realms
commonly associated with contemplative practices and beliefs,
since such considerations are currently outside of the scope of sci-
entific measurement and analysis. This is not a value judgment,
but simply a matter of practicality. We do not dismiss or discount
such phenomena as “enlightenment” or the role of the Guru-
disciple relationship in the process of “awakening”; we simply
have chosen to focus on the more tangible aspects of meditation
practice.
We fully expect that as we learn more about the phenomenon
of meditation, the assumptions and structure of our definitional
and taxonomic models will need to be modified or replaced to
adapt to new understandings. Hopefully researchers will be inter-
ested in our proposals, will test their efficacy, and offer suggestions
and improvements that will ultimately lead to the attainment of
a consensual definition and taxonomy for the field of meditation
research.
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END NOTES
1. “pure consciousness”:
“. . .. ‘pure consciousness’ or ‘emptiness’ is devoid of phenomeno-
logical content, and by its nature requires transcending of the
processes and objects of meditation. If processes or objects were
there, it would not be this widely described experience.” Travis
and Shear (2010b) It “is ‘pure’ in the sense that it is free from
the processes and contents of knowing. It is a state of ‘conscious-
ness’ in that the knower is conscious through the experience,
and can, afterwards, describe it. The ‘content’ of pure conscious-
ness is self-awareness. In contrast, the contents of normal waking
experiences are outer objects or inner thoughts and feelings.”
(p. 79). “Subjectively, this state is characterized by the absence
of the very framework (time, space, and body sense) and con-
tent (qualities of inner and outer perception) that define waking
experiences. Physiologically, this state is distinguished by the pres-
ence of apneustic breathing, autonomic orienting at the onset
of breath changes, and increases in the frequency of peak EEG
power.” Travis and Pearson (2000, p. 77).
2. “absolute unitary being” (AUB):
“. . .. an absolute sense of unity — without thought, without
words, and without sensation . . .without ego in a state of pure,
undifferentiated awareness.” Newberg and d’Aquili; (2001, p.
119–27).
3. “non-dual awareness” (NDA):
There is “a more profound difference, one that cannot be ade-
quately captured within a single-dimension characterization of
attentional strategy. Both focused attention and open monitoring
styles of meditation contain an essentially dualistic orientation of
‘subject-observing-object’. there is another group of meditations
that do not employ this strategy, but instead rely on accessing
a level of awareness that is inherently free from this dualistic
subject-object construct. This non-conceptual awareness has
sometimes been termed non-dual awareness, open awareness or
open presence.” Josipovic (2010).
“There are 2 aspects of non-duality: (1) non-duality without
experiential content, also known as ‘pure consciousness’ in
Vedanta or ‘isolated clear light’ in Tibetan Buddhism; which is
Absolute only and (2) non-duality with full experiential content;
a.k.a ‘open presence’ in Tibetan Buddhism, Saguna Brahman of
Vedanta, etc., in other words the unity of Absolute and Relative.”
Josipovic (2013, pers. commun.).
4. “focused attention” (FA):
“A widespread style of Buddhist practice consists in sustaining
selective attention moment by moment on a chosen object,
such as a subset of localized sensations caused by respiration. To
sustain this focus, the meditator must also constantly monitor
the quality of attention. . . . while cultivating the acuity and
stability of sustained attention on a chosen object, this practice
also develops three skills regulative of attention: the first is the
monitoring faculty that remains vigilant to distractions without
destabilizing the intended focus. The next skill is the ability to
disengage from a distracting object without further involvement.
The last consists in the ability to redirect focus promptly to the
chosen object.” Lutz et al. (2008b, p. 163–169).
5. “open-monitoring” (OM):
“Openmonitoring or mindfulness-basedmeditations, involve the
non-reactive monitoring of the content of ongoing experience,
primarily as a means to become reflectively aware of the nature
of emotional and cognitive patterns.” Raffone and Srinivasan
(2010). “Open monitoring practices are based on an attentive set
characterized by an open presence and a non-judgmental aware-
ness of sensory, cognitive and affective fields of experience in the
present moment and involves a higher-order meta-awareness of
ongoing mental processes” (Cahn and Polich, 2006)—in Travis
and Shear (2010a).
“While varied, OM practices share a number of core features,
including especially the initial use of FA training to calm the
mind and reduce distractions. As FA advances, the well developed
monitoring skill becomes the main point of transition into OM
practice. One aims to remain only in the monitoring state, atten-
tive moment by moment to anything that occurs in experience
without focusing on any explicit object. To reach this state, the
practitioner gradually reduces the focus on an explicit object in
FA, and the monitoring faculty is correspondingly emphasized.
Usually there is also an increasing emphasis on cultivating a
‘reflexive’ awareness that grants one greater access to the rich
features of each experience, such as the degree of phenomenal
intensity, the emotional tone, and the active cognitive schema.”
Lutz et al. (2008b, p. 163–169).
6. “open-presence” (OP):
“. . . unlike other meditations, at advanced stages of the prac-
tice there is no attempt either to suppress or to cultivate any
particular mental content. One does not focus, for example, on
a visualized image or on a sensory object such as a sensation
made by the breath. In this sense the state of Open Presence is
objectless. Nevertheless, even though higher levels of the prac-
tice do not involve any particular content or object, it also is
important for content to be occurring in the mind because to
cultivate an awareness of the invariant nature of experience, one
must be having experiences. Indeed, for beginners it is prefer-
able that the experiences be especially striking or clear. Thus, even
though the meditation is objectless, it is not a state of blankness
or withdrawal. Sensory events are still experienced, sometimes
even more vividly. In terms of technique, this facet of the med-
itation is indicated by the fact that one meditates with the eyes
open and directed somewhat upward.” “The move to an emphasis
on subjectivity is further encouraged by dropping any deliberate
focus on an object. As a sensory content or mental event occurs,
one observes it (sometimes along with the momentary use of a
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discursive strategy), and then one releases any focus on it. This is
similar to the Vipassanâ practice discussed above, except that after
releasing the content or event one does not return to any object.
Instead, one releases the mind into its ‘natural state’ (rang babs),
which one understands to be the state reflecting only the invari-
ant nature of consciousness, and not the accidental properties of
subject and object.” Lutz et al. (2007, p. 38–42).
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | The taxonomic keys.
The initial descriptor should include the name of the method including mention of any particular style or subset (because several techniques may be
grouped together under one generic name, when in fact they may be significantly different). A general reference to the history, origin and culture is
optional.
THE SPECIFIC KEYS
(1) Description of the specific cognitive strategy(ies) which are prescribed for the practitioner within the method’s directions (what one has to do in order
to achieve the intended result) i.e., concentration; focused attention or awareness; passive observation without attachment; visualization and
imagination; memorization and repetition; selective awareness; effortless awareness; contemplation, introspection and inquiry; sensual
perception(s), etc.
(2) The conceptual and/or physical foci—the object(s) of attention i.e., mantra, symbol, image, phrase, idea, narrative, sound, light, etc.
(3) Any beliefs or special knowledge either suggested or required i.e., a particular theoretical, religious, spiritual, metaphysical, or philosophical system
(4) Whether the eyes are closed or are open and used in some specific fashion
(5) Whether the process is static* or kinetic**
(6) Whether the process is non-verbal (silent) or verbal (auditory) or both
(7) Whether a specific seated or reclined postural form is suggested or required
(8) Whether the process is intrinsic (self-reliant/independent) or extrinsic (dependent on an outside person or process)
(9) Whether there are any specific recommendations for type or control of breathing
*“static”: refers to a stationary body but not necessarily an immobile body. Therefore, bodily movements may occur but the body still remains essentially in one
place as when the meditator changes postures during a single meditation session (i.e., from an upright sitting position to a more reclined position), or experiences
involuntary jerking motions (kriyas). Specific postural criteria may or may not be present.
**“kinetic”: refers to prescribed movements of the body with specific postural instructions; usually, but not limited to, movement of the extremities such as in
walking mindfulness training, Tai Chi, mudras (hand movements), or even “bouncing” as in TM-Siddhi “yogic flying.”
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